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EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE WAKE OF FARAGHER AND ELLERTH.
Erin Ardale t
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in the workplace has emerged in the past two
decades as one of the most complex and emotional issues facing employ-
ers, employees, and human resource professionals today. In 1980, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) declared sexual
harassment a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since
then, the courts have struggled to determine what constitutes sexual har-
assment and the circumstances under which employers may incur liabil-
ity for the sexual harassment of employees by coworkers and
supervisors.
No one seriously criticizes the strides that courts have made in pro-
tecting employees from what has been described as quid pro quo sexual
harassment, or harassment when a tangible job benefit is at stake, such as
a promotion or continued employment.' In such a case, courts impose
liability on employers for the conduct of supervisors, consistent with the
EEOC Guidelines. 2 When courts tackle the second recognizable cate-
gory of sexual harassment cases, or hostile work environment claims,
they have been less clear. A hostile work environment occurs when an
employee is not threatened with loss of a tangible job benefit but still is
subjected to a hostile or offensive working environment.3 Scholars have
criticized courts in hostile work environment cases for not only refusing
to set out cognizable guidelines under which employers can prevent lia-
bility but also for sometimes going too far and enforcing liability when
the alleged harm is not so easy to see.4 The Meritor court determined the
hostile work place harassment to be a form of clear sexual discrimination
under Title VII.5 Lower courts have grappled with the issue ever since,
with varying degrees of clarity.
t Cornell Law School, J.D. expected May 2000.
1 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 824 (1991).
2 See generally Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
3 See Estrich, supra note 1, at 824.
4 See, e.g., Katherine Philippakis, Comment, When Employers Should be Liable for Su-
pervisory Personnel: Applying Agency Principles to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Cases, 28 Amiz. ST. L.J. 1275 (1996).
5 See Meritor, 477 U.S at 65.
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After twelve years of confusion, the Supreme Court has finally ad-
dressed the issue of hostile work environment head on, particularly in the
case of supervisor to subordinate employee harassment. In parallel deci-
sions in June of 1998,6 the Supreme Court clarified an employer's obli-
gation to rid the workplace of sexual harassment by finding employers
vicariously liable for harassment that does not result in a tangible job
detriment. 7 Such liability, however, is subject to an affirmative defense
that the employer had promulgated an effective sexual harassment policy
and complaint system and that the allegedly harassed employee failed to
take advantage of such procedures in place. 8 The Court also clarified its
position on quid pro quo harassment, asserting that when a supervisor's
sexual harassment leads to a tangible job detriment, the defined affirma-
tive defenses are not available and the employer will be absolutely liable
for the harassment.9
Employers' liability for sexual harassment has had and will con-
tinue to have a positive effect in American workplaces. Imposing liabil-
ity for sexual harassment under the law has a deterrent effect that
motivates the employer to prevent and resolve the problem, as well as
provide relief for the victims. The process works because employers are
in the best position to carry the burden - to stop harassment before it
starts, by educating employees, by providing avenues of redress, and by
holding harassing employees accountable for their actions.10
Keeping that burden in mind, however, the law has arguably gone
too far. By holding employers strictly liable for sexual harassment in the
workplace - whether or not the victim has actually been injured in some
measurable way - the Supreme Court has put employers in a tough posi-
tion. Under the Supreme Court's new rulings, employers are liable for
the sexual harassment by their supervising employees if the company
does not have a sexual harassment policy that provides a process for
reporting and dealing with offensive behavior. Further, the opinions
seem to suggest that even if the company does have such a sexual harass-
ment policy but the harassed employee reasonably follows through with
his or her responsibilities under that policy by filing a grievance with a
company representative, for example, the employer is still liable. Even
after doing their best, employers are left with no line of defense, but
instead bear the costs of facilitating the sexual harassment redress and
prevention system that the courts have forced upon them.
6 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
7 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 766.
8 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 766.
9 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 766.
10 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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Based on an expansive interpretation of the rulings, nothing short of
twenty-four hour surveillance of employees, or hope that an employee
will fail to do his or her job in reporting the offensive behavior, will
prevent employer liability. In such a situation, the costs of prevention
are too high - employers must bear the enormous costs arising out of an
impossible system in order to prevent a small number of sexual harass-
ment cases. At some point, the costs start to outweigh the benefits and
the law is too burdensome. Further, under such a system employers are
pitted against employees. When a responsible employer's only hope of
escaping liability for the acts of its supervising employees is the remote
chance that the harassed employee will slip and not follow the com-
pany's grievance procedure, the law has failed. A common assumption
in the workplace is that most employers share employees concerns in
preventing sexual harassment, but when they cannot trust each other, that
concern becomes subordinate to one of self interest in preventing liabil-
ity. This Note will examine in detail the many costs to employers and
determine whether they outweigh the benefit society receives from cur-
rent sexual harassment law.
Part I of this Note sketches out in detail the history of sexual harass-
ment law in the United States, from its origin in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's Guidelines in 1980, to theU.S. Supreme Court's Meritor decision
in 1986. Part I details the new standard set forth in the 1998 Faragher
and Ellerth decisions by the Supreme Court. Part ImI discusses the costs
and benefits of the new standards using both an economic and societal
analysis in an attempt to evaluate the wisdom of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions. Concluding that the judicial standards are generally un-
reasonably burdensome, Part IV discusses these decisions' implications
for employers, sketching out the risks and solutions to counter those
risks.
I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW
A. TITLE VII OF THE CiviL RiG-rrs ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex." Iron-
ically enough, despite the far-reaching implications the category "sex"
has had on the law, the inclusion of the protected category of "sex" was
11 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.. .to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.").
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an accident. Members of Congress opposing the bill added the language
as an amendment one day before the House passed the Civil Rights Act
in 1964.12 The members thought that the inclusion of the category would
emphasize the bill's absurdity and effectively kill it by making it too
extreme. 13 The tactic obviously failed, but it explains why there is little
legislative history to guide the courts in interpreting the meaning of sex
discrimination. 14 However, as sexual harassment became more visible
through the efforts of modem feminist scholars and popular magazines in
the 1970s and 1980s, advocates began to view Title VII as a possible
avenue for sexual harassment litigation. 15
Title VII is a powerful tool for traditionally disadvantaged individu-
als. First, it allows individuals the opportunity to take up a cause of
action in federal court and consequently avoid strict state law and possi-
ble prejudice from state court juries. 16 Second, its procedural rules are
traditionally structured to work in favor of the plaintiff by lessening the
plaintiff's burden of establishing the prima facie case.17 Instead of meet-
ing the difficult requirement of invidious intent, plaintiffs only need to
present quantitative data or testimony about particular events or the dis-
criminatory character of questionable policies.' 8
Prior to the 1980s, sexual harassment was not available as a cause
of action under Title VII. Women attempted to recover damages for
mental distress and humiliation occasioned by proposals of illicit inter-
course but recovery was usually denied because courts reasoned there
was no harm in just asking for sex.' 9 Courts would dismiss cases be-
cause they considered sexual advances made by one employee to an-
other, and even by a supervisor to a subordinate employee, merely
personal conduct and not employment related. 20
This rationale continued in more recent judicial reasoning. Until
1980, the federal judiciary had few cases in which the interaction of Title
VII and sexual harassment was the central issue of the case. While the
judicial system first interpreted Title VII as forbidding sexual harassment
12 See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
13 See icL (Members Smith, Tuten, Andrews, Green, and Rivers commenting on the in-
troduction of gender into the statute).
14 See Estrich, supra note 1, at 824.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903) (holding that "as there
was no assault upon or trespass against the person of the plaintiff, and no physical injury
produced, it seems to us that no recovery can be had"); cf., Rolland v. Batchelder, 84 Va. 665,
5 S.E. 695 (1888). See generally SUSAN G. MEzEY, IN PuRsurr OF EQUALITY: WorMEN, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND THE FEDZ.RAL COURTS (1992).
EMPLOYER LIABLrrY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
in a case in 1976,21 the vast majority of courts refused to hold sexual
harassment actionable as a form of gender-based discrimination in many
other cases until the mid-1980s. Those courts that did allow a cause of
action under Title VII differed on the nature and the circumstances under
which they held employers liable for acts of sexual harassment by em-
ployees.22 For example, in 1975 the Arizona District Court in Come v.
Bausch denied recovery against an employer for the quid pro quo harass-
ment.23 In that case, two female clerical workers alleged harassment by
their supervisor when he offered favorable employment treatment for
compliance with his verbal and physical sexual advances, propositions,
and demands.24 The court refused to find Title VII applicable, holding
that Congress did not intend sexual harassment to be a cause of action,
and suggested that, absent a policy permitting, encouraging, or requiring
sexual harassment, no employer is liable for sexual harassment of its
employees by their coworkers or supervisors.25 The courts asserted it
was unwise to delve into the issue in other cases, such as Tompkins v.
Public Serv. Elec & Gas26 and Miller v. Bank of America,27 finding that
sexual attraction was natural and would probably play into personnel de-
cisions subtly.
B. 1980 EEOC GUIDELINS
In a landmark work, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Pro-
fessor Catherine MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment should be
21 See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
22 See, e.g, Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D. N.H.
1976) (requiring actual or constructive knowledge of supervisor's conduct and failure to take
remedial action before holding employer liable for sexual harassment involving tangible job
detriment); Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4e Cir. 1977) (complaint
alleging an employer policy of compelling female employees to submit to sexual advances by
male supervisors stated a cause of action under Title VII); Miller v. Bank of America, 600
F.2d. 211 (9h Cir. 1979) (finding an employer would be liable for the tortious conduct of its
employees under Tite VII, at least where the action complained of was that of a supervisor,
authorized to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend such
actions); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. .Ariz. 1975), vacated in part,
562 F.2d 55 (9" Cir. 1977) ( (holding there was no right to relief under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for sexual harassment by a supervisor, where there was no employer policy served by the
alleged conduct, no benefit to the employer was involved and the supervisor's alleged conduct
had no relationship to the nature of the employment); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (finding that sexual harassment by a supervisor was unlawful under Title VII even
though the statute does not specifically speak to such circumstances).
23 See Come, 390 F.Supp. at 161.
24 See id. See also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (not-
ing that this "discrimination policy" had not been applied to other forms of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII).
25 See Come, 390 F.Supp. at 163.
26 422 F. Supp. at 557 (permitting such actions would create the need for "4,000 federal
trial judges instead of some 400").
27 418 F. Supp. at 236.
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considered sexual discrimination actionable under Title VII in 1979.28
The following year, in 1980, the EEOC followed her lead and adopted
Guidelines declaring sexual harassment a violation of Title VII ("EEOC
Guidelines" or "Guidelines"). 29 The Guidelines established criteria for
determining what constitutes sexual harassment and defined the circum-
stances under which employer liability for the sexual harassment of em-
ployees by supervisory personnel and other agents or coworkers may be
imposed.30 The courts finally had some guidance to turn to in deciding
difficult sexual harassment issues. The EEOC defined sexual harassment
as:
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.. .when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of
an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions af-
fecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 3'
Further, the EEOC issued instructions to its agents in the field to
look at and investigate the whole record and totality of the circumstances
leading up to the filing of the claim by the complainant. 32 Under the
Guidelines, the investigation may consider the nature and context of the
acts alleged to have occurred to determine the legality of the challenged
activity, the nature of employer liability, and the appropriate remedies
available in that particular case.33
The 1980 EEOC Guidelines were the first to bifurcate employer lia-
bility to include the two categories that affect the nature of employer
liability for sexual harassment and the proof required to establish it. In
the first category, quid pro quo harassment, or harassment resulting in
tangible job detriment, employers were held to a theory of strict liabil-
ity.3 4 In the second category, employers were liable in agency under a
theory of respondeat superior, for hostile environment sexual harass-
28 See generally CATHERINE A. MAcKiNNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING VO.
MEN 1 (1979).
29 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
30 See id. Courts generally accept that the EEOC Guidelines represent the relevant ad-
ministrative agency's interpretation of the Act, and thus may constitute experience and judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may resort for guidance, but they are not necessarily
controlling. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
31 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
32 See id. § 1604.11(b).
33 See id.
34 See LAWRENCE SOLOTOFF AND HENRY S. KRAMER, EDS., SExuAL DISCRIMINATION
AND SEXUAL HARAssMENT IrN THE WORKPLACE, § 3.02[2] (1998).
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ment.35 In addition, the EEOCmade a distinction between supervisor-
subordinate harassment and coworker harassment. The Guidelines deter-
mined that employers will be liable for their acts and the acts of their
agents with respect to sexual harassment "regardless of whether the spe-
cific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the em-
ployer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence. ' 36 When harassment is between fellow em-
ployees, employers are liable for the harassing employee's conduct
whether they knew or should have known of their occurrence unless the
employer can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tion.37 Finally, the EEOC made suggestions to employers regarding
what they could do to avoid liability, such as expressing strong disap-
proval, taking preventive action in the nature of training, policy develop-
ment, implementation, enforcement, and affirmatively sensitizing the
workforce about sexual harassment laws and guidelines. 38
C. MEmToR AND THE RF_sULTIG CONFUSION
By the mid-1980s patterns began to emerge in the courts' treatment
of employer liability. Generally, employers faced strict liability for quid
pro quo harassment.39 Employer liability for hostile work environment
however proved to be a more difficult issue for courts and there was a
clear lack of consensus. The majority view was that an employer was
liable for harassment only if it had actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial actions.40 A mi-
nority of courts held that hostile environment harassment by a supervisor
should subject employers to strict liability, for the same reasons the stan-
dard existed for quid pro quo harassment, but the employer should be
35 See id.
36 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1980).
37 See id. § 1604.11(d).
38 See id. § 1604.11(f).
39 See e.g. Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7d' Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251 (4"' Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11"' Cir. 1982).
40 See e.g. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (holding that an employer is strictly liable for the
actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimination or sexual harassment resulting
in tangible job detriment to a subordinate employee. In a hostile work environment case, the
plaintiff must prove that higher management knew or should have known of the sexual harass-
ment before the employer may be held liable); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255 (holding that a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a
sexually hostile working environment in a "condition of work" case); Jones v. Flagship Int'l,
793 F.2d 714, 720 (5d' Cir. 1986) (holding that while an employee need not prove tangible job
detriment to establish a sexual harassment, the absence of such proof requires a higher show-
ing that the harassment was pervasive and destructive to the work environment).
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liable under an actual or constructive knowledge standard for hostile en-
vironment harassment by coemployees. 41
In 1986 the Supreme Court, acknowledging the disparity between
jurisdictions, finally decided to resolve many of the questions the courts
were struggling with and granted certiorari to hear its first sexual harass-
ment decision. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,42 the Supreme
Court tackled a series of issues. First, the Court addressed whether a
claim solely alleging a "hostile environment" is actionable under Title
VII and whether a claimant is required to prove a loss of an economic or
tangible job benefit to have a cause of action for such violation. 43 Sec-
ond, it tackled whether a court may properly inquire into the voluntari-
ness of a claimant's participation in the claimed sexual episodes and to
what extent the court may inquire into the welcomeness of sexual ad-
vances. 44 Third, the Court inquired under what circumstances the em-
ployer may be strictly liable for the acts of its agents and supervisors and
how may the employer insulate or defend itself from such liability.45
The Court, holding that a hostile environment claim is actionable,
first reasoned that the Title VII phrase "'terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment'. . .evinces a congressional intent" to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment and
is not limited to economic or tangible loss.46 Such a claim is actionable
if the harassment is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. 47 The
Court quoted a Fifth Circuit racial discrimination case to suggest that the
"'utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to a
sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII."'48
Second, on the relevance of voluntariness, the Court decided that
the appropriate inquiry was not whether the complainant acted volunta-
rily but whether the particular conduct was unwelcome. 49 The Court
pointed to the EEOC Guidelines and the need to review the whole record
41 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding a Title VII
violation for sexual harassment regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any
tangible job benefits as a result); Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F.Supp. 78, 82-83 (D.Alaska
1985) (rejecting the notion that knowledge would be required for quid pro quo harassment but
not for hostile work environment).
42 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 64.
47 See id. at 66-67. The Supreme Court later decided that Title VII may be violated
regardless of whether the victim suffered psychological harm in an abusive or hostile working
environment. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
48 Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5"' Cir. 1971)).
49 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
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and the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.50 Sex-
ually provocative dress or speech would be relevant then only in deter-
mining the "welcomeness" of the incident.
Third, while the Supreme Court refused to issue a definitive ruling
on employer liability, it did direct the lower courts to consult agency
principles for guidance on the issue.51 The Court reasoned that because
Title VII's definition of "employer" includes an "agent" of the employer,
it evidences a congressional intent to use agency law to place some limits
on employers' liability for sexual harassment.52 The Court rejected the
notion that absolute liability should be imposed on employers in every
claim of hostile environment regardless of the circumstances of the par-
ticular case. In hostile environment cases, no employer, or at least those
employers that have instituted policies against harassment, would be lia-
ble in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge.5 3
II. FARAGHER AND ELLERTH: THE SUPREME COURT SETS
NEW STANDARDS
The guidance of Meritor has proven inadequate. Despite Meritor's
suggestions, disagreement persists among jurisdictions as to what the
standard of employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment
should be. Some courts hold employers liable for hostile environment
sexual harassment only if the employer knew or should have known of
the problem.5 4 Other courts make a distinction depending upon the iden-
tity of the harasser and hold employers strictly liable for supervisors'
hostile environment harassment, but impose employer liability for co-
workers' harassment only if the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment.55 Still other courts hinge employer liability on the em-
ployer's response to the harassment once it is brought to their attention.56
Quid pro quo harassment seems to be settled; while the Supreme Court,
50 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)).
51 See id. at 72.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 72-73 ("Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an
employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of
employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible").
54 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9' Cir. 1991); Guess v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7T' Cir. 1990); Baker v. Yeyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342,
1346 (10' Cir. 1990); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6' Cir. 1985).
55 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11"- Cir.
1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558(11"' Cir. 1987).
56 See, e.g., Bouton v. BMW, 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3' Cir. 1994) (holding that an effective
grievance procedure that is known to the victim and timely stops the harasser shields the
employer from Title VII liability).
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in Meritor did not address it, circuits consistently hold that employers are
strictly liable.5 7
The inadequacy of the Meritor decision, as exemplified in the con-
fusion of subsequent rulings by the lower courts, led the Supreme Court
to revisit the issue of sexual harassment in two recent parallel cases. In
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton58 and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,59
the Supreme Court, in 7-2 decisions, clarified an employer's obligation
to rid the workplace of sexual harassment.
Faragher involved a female lifeguard who worked for the City of
Boca Raton from 1985 until she resigned in 1990.60 During her employ-
ment, two of her supervisors engaged in unwanted physical touching,
pantomimed various sexual acts, and made vulgar references. 61 Ms.
Faragher did not formally complain about the actions but instead infor-
mally discussed them with a third supervisor.62 The City ultimately
learned of the behavior of the two supervisors before Faragher's resigna-
tion but not from Faragher herself.63 The District Court granted judg-
ment in favor of Faragher but the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment
against the City, finding that the two supervisors were not acting within
the scope of their employment when harassing Faragher and the City had
no constructive or actual knowledge of the harassment. 64 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that even when an employer is unaware of the
harassment "there is a sense in which a harassing supervisor is always
assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship. ' 65 The Court
further said, "[w]hen a person with supervisory authority discriminates in
the terms and conditions of subordinates' employment, his actions neces-
sarily draw upon his superior position over the people who report to
him."' 66 The Court determined that the loss resulting from the supervi-
sor's acts should be considered to be one of the normal risks to be borne
by the business in which the supervisor is employed.67
In Ellerth, a salesperson was subjected to fifteen months of repeated
offensive remarks and gestures by her supervisor but also received a pro-
57 See, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 785 (1St Cir. 1990); Steele v.
Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11 h Cir. 1989); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l
Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 649 (6t Cir. 1986); Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689
F.Supp. 774, 780 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
58 See 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
59 See 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
60 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
61 See id. at 782.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 783.
64 See id. at 783-84.
65 Id. at 802.
66 Id. at 803.
67 See id. at 797.
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motion and suffered no tangible job detriment. 68 Like Ms. Faragher, Ms.
Ellerth failed to complain about the harassment. 69 Unlike the City of
Boca Raton however, Burlington Industries had a sexual harassment pol-
icy that had been distributed to all employees. Ms. Ellerth was aware of
the policy but chose not to use it.7° The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Burlington but the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding
the evidence sufficient to sustain a claim of quid pro quo harassment.71
The Supreme Court affirmed, determining that Ms. Ellerth presented a
viable sexual harassment claim, despite the fact that she suffered no tan-
gible job injury.72 The court determined that the characterization of El-
lerth's claim as quid pro quo or hostile work environment was not
dispositive and Burlington was subject to liability for the supervisor's
activity whether tangible job detriment occurred or not.73
Both the Faragher and Ellerth decisions used identical language to
set forth an employer's obligations and the scope of an employer's liabil-
ity for sexual harassment in the workplace: "[a]n employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile en-
vironment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee." 74 When no tangible employment
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.75 Such a defense consists of two necessary elements: first, that
the employer must exercise "reasonable care" to prevent and promptly
correct any sexually harassing behavior; and second, that the plaintiff-
employee "unreasonably" failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm or
otherwise.76 According to the Court, "[n]o affirmative defense is avail-
able when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employ-
ment action, such a discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. '77
In Faragher, although the plaintiff employee suffered no tangible
job action, the City would not have the opportunity to raise an affirma-
tive defense to her claim because it "entirely failed to disseminate its
policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees. '78 Con-
versely, in Ellerth, the Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of
68 See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998).
69 See id. at 748.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 749-50.
72 See id. at 766.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 765. See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 807 (1998).
75 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
76 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
77 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
78 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
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summary judgment in favor of Burlington, but remanded the case to per-
mit the employer the opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative de-
fense that it maintained and promulgated its sexual harassment policy
and that Ms. Ellerth unreasonably failed to utilize the policy. 79
These two decisions place far more weight upon the employer to
take proactive steps to eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace than
previous decisions. The exact implications however, are not clear. For
example, what must an employer do to take "reasonable care" to prevent
and correct sexual harassment? Further, when has an employee "unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportu-
nities?" 80 The Court has carelessly left these important details to the
discretion of the lower courts but did at least send a clear message that a
premium has been placed upon employers taking a proactive approach to
sexual harassment in their workplaces.
Ill. THE BURDENS OF FARAGHER AND ELLERTH: TOO MUCH
TO JUSTIFY STRICT LIABILITY?
A. JuDICIAL EFFICIENCY
From an efficiency perspective, it is only worthwhile to allocate
costs of sexual harassment through the judicial system to employers to
the extent that the costs of doing so do not outweigh the benefits. Many
feminist writers argue that all loss from sexual harassment must be elimi-
nated without regard to the cost.81 However, in a world where resources
are exhaustible and economics drive individual expectations and goals,
employers cannot afford to ignore the balancing of costs and benefits.
Several commentators have suggested that the imposition of vicari-
ous liability may be the most cost effective and efficient manner of
preventing sexual harassment. 82 The employer, rather than the supervi-
sor or employer, is in the best position to prevent harm because the em-
ployer, being "the master", selects "the servant" (or supervisor), controls
the servant's responsibilities, and promulgates workplace policy.83 Fur-
ther, commentators assert that holding employers vicariously liable for
the acts of their employees dramatically increases the likelihood that the
79 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766.
80 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
81 See e.g Jane Byeff Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harass-
ment, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1363, 1386 (1993) (arguing that "[a]lthough sexual harassment is com-
monplace, we need not accept it as a risk inherent in the workplace. It can, unlike true
industrial accidents, be eliminated.").
82 See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL
L. REv. 66 (1995); Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal
Level of Loss, 47 VAND. L. Rnv. 427 (1994).
83 See Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 93.
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victim will be compensated for his or her injuries because the employer
can insure against vicarious liability for harassment or treat the liability
as a price of doing business.84 While these assertions may very well be
true generally, they are too broad, and when incorporated as justification
for sexual harassment law, as they have been with the Ellerth and
Faragher decisions, create a dangerous burden of liability for employers.
Professor Marie Reilly proposes an economic paradigm for sexual
harassment.8 5 The paradigm mimics Judge Learned Hand's formula for
negligence by "encourag[ing] prevention of loss up to the point at which
the saved loss is no longer worth the price of precaution." 86 In her pre-
FaragherlEllerth article, Professor Reilly applies her paradigm to strict
employer liability for both quid pro quo harassment and hostile work
environment harassment, finding the former economically efficient but
the latter inefficient when imposed without regard to notice or fault of
the employer itself.87
Professor Reilly asserts that making an employer strictly liable for
the negligence of its employees makes sense because it creates an incen-
tive for employers to require the level of care from employees that they
themselves would take when responding to their own personal liability. 88
The employer has an incentive to supervise its employees and impose
sanctions or rewards where justified as long as the cost is offset by an
equivalent reduction in the expected loss.89 She maintains however that
the vicarious liability of an employer is subject to an economically im-
portant limitation.90 In the case of quid pro quo harassment, the em-
ployer, by definition, has "caused" the loss - the effects of sexual
harassment - in the economic sense.91 Therefore, the loss is properly
considered a cost of the operation of the employer's business.92
In the case of hostile work environment harassment however, find-
ing efficiency becomes more complex. Unlike quid pro quo harassment,
the employment relationship does not fully cause the loss in the same
sense. Professor Reilly illustrates this point:
[f]or example, suppose a female worker alleges that
her co-workers tell sexual jokes and use vulgar language
in her presence. Hypothetically removing the employ-
ment relationship between the offensive co-workers and
84 See id. at 93-94.
85 See Reilly, supra note 82, at 427.
86 Id. at 441.
87 See id. at 453, 469.
88 See id. at 455.
89 See iL
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id,
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the employer would not reduce the probability of loss to
zero. Thus, according to the economic concept of proba-
bilistic causation, the employer did not fully cause the
loss. 93
Consequently, by imposing strict liability on the employer without regard
to its fault or notice results in production inefficiency. 94
Judge Posner appears to agree with Professor Reilly's paradigm. In
his pre-Faragher/Ellerth writings, he discusses the economic rationale
for employer liability in sexual harassment cases. He argues that em-
ployers are more responsive to the threat of tort liability unlike most
employees, who do not have the resources to pay a judgment if they
injure someone seriously - because employers can induce employees to
be careful. 95 By making an employer liable for the torts of its employ-
ees, the law will give the employer incentive to use such inducements. 96
Judge Posner reviews the law as widely recognized under Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,97 where an employer would only be liable for
harassment if it had reason to know that sexual harassment was a prob-
lem and failed to do anything about it. 8 Under pre-Faragher/Ellerth law
the employer would not be liable in such a case unless negligent, which
Posner explains is due to the virtual impossibility of an employer
preventing all incidents of sexual harassment by employees and therefore
the imposition of strict liability has no beneficial allocative effects. 99
Applying this economic analysis to the current state of the law, it is
clear that the total cost to employers of ensuring that incidents of sexual
harassment do not occur is so great as to outweigh the importance of
attempting to eliminate such harassment from workplaces. The burden
of strict liability is too much to impose for sexual threats or comments
that affect the lives and well-being of the victim but do not do so in any
recognizable or measurable way that an employer can cognizably
prevent.
93 Id. at 469. Other commentators disagree. For example, Professor Alan 0. Sykes as-
serts that a strong argument can be made that the harassment by a supervisor is caused by the
employer's enterprise, whether or not tangible job detriment is involved or not. See Alan 0.
Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employ-
ment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563, 606-07 (1988). Professor
Sykes argues that "absent the existence of a supervisor-subordinate relationship, the supervisor
would have no leverage over the subordinate, and the likelihood of sexual harassment would
be significantly reduced." Id. while Professor Sykes acknowledges that the causal relation-
ship to the employer enterprise is strongest in quid pro quo cases, he argues that it also maybe
quite strong for hostile-environment harassment by supervisors. See id.
94 See Reilly, supra note 82, at 469.
95 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 187 (4th ed. 1992).
96 See id.
97 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
98 See POSNER, supra note 95, at 188.
99 See id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has taken strict liability too far with the
Faragher and Ellerth decisions when this economic analysis is taken into
account. The rationale that justifies strict liability in the case of quid pro
quo harassment does not justify it in the case of hostile work environ-
ment harassment that results in no tangible job detriment. In quid pro
quo harassment, the employer knows or should know of the harassment
because it is in effect part of the employment enterprise. The employer
therefore, at least in theory, has an opportunity to stop harassment by
scrutinizing its supervisors for improper behavior and firing, demoting,
etc. in response. While the court treats them the same, the hostile envi-
ronment harassment that results in no tangible job detriment, even when
subject to an affirmative defense, is distinctly different from quid quo pro
harassment. A supervisor in the hostile work environment case has not
actually used any of his or her authority; at best he or she has only con-
templated it.100 The employer has not acted in any official capacity be-
cause it has no notice or record of the action which gives rise to the
employee's claim because no tangible effect on the employee's employ-
ment status has occurred. 10 1
Expecting an employer to prevent all such harassment is impossible
and such liability thus places a bigger burden upon employers than is
economically efficient or feasible. Strict liability that is imposed when
no reasonable measures could have prevented the harassment will have
no deterrent effect and is actually contrary to public policy. The law as
promulgated in Ellerth and Faragher could, in a sense, backfire if em-
ployers become discouraged from implementing reasonable sexual har-
assment policies that afford them no protection from liability.10 2 Despite
their best efforts in implementing a fair and reasonable policy to combat
such harassment, and despite what they knew or should have known as a
result of such a policy, if an employee follows through on his or her end
of the Court's bargain and reports the harassment, employers are strictly
liable for the sexual harassment of their employees. In practicality, even
24-hour-a-day video surveillance may not be enough to help employers
prevent harassment, creating a burden of liability that can in no way be
lightened.
Employers are faced with an impossible burden of attempting to
eradicate workplace harassment while respecting employee privacy.
Employers may go to great lengths to prevent liability, implementing
highly invasive means of detecting and monitoring the daily actions and
conversations of their workers. Such strides could prove dangerous, in-
vading the constitutional privacy rights that employees do not necessarily
100 See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
101 See id.
102 See id.
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shed at their company's doorstep. In addition, in their efforts to prove
the efficacy of their anti-harassment policies under the first prong of the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense,10 3 employers will have incentives
to show the corrective actions they took regarding any suspicious con-
duct in the workplace, without regard to the privacy concerns on the part
of the people involved. 10 4 Employers can hardly be blamed, as anything
less will imperil their proof that their policies are effective. Moreover,
serious First Amendment violations could result if employers attempt to
restrict any sexually-suggestive speech, whether or not it creates a hostile
work environment under the law. These risks only add to the costs of
strict liability for such harassment, tipping the scale even further towards
inefficiency.
B. SOCmTAL EFFICIENCY
This analysis can be taken a step further. When cost-benefit analy-
sis is taken beyond evaluation of costs of implementing effective sexual
harassment policies or costs of resulting litigation, the scale of efficiency
possibly can be tipped in the opposite direction so that benefits outweigh
costs. In that balance, strict liability for all forms of sexual harassment
can be justified, at least more effectively than it can under the current
method of assessing costs.
No one can deny that sexual harassment in the workplace creates a
variety of foreseeable consequences, and thus costs, affecting the well-
being of employees and the productivity of organizations. Many com-
mentators assert therefore that identification of the various consequences
of sexual harassment is needed to fully understand its implications.10 5
Such a variety of costs can quickly add up to a substantial dollar amount
for organizations when aggregated across a large number of employees.
Several methods have been used to determine the economic impact
of employee actions, including sexual harassment. Deborah Erdos
Knapp and Gary A. Kustis created a comprehensive behavior costing
model framed in terms of three broad categories of costs: productivity-
related costs, administrative costs, and other costs. 10 6 First, productivity-
related costs include actual reductions in productivity as a result of har-
assment, the cost of time spent during the harassing incident, and the cost
of any unplanned leave or absenteeism that results from the harass-
103 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
104 Brief for Respondent at 21, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
105 See, e.g., Kathy A. Hanisch, An Integrated Framework for Studying the Outcomes of
Sexual Harassment: Consequences for Individuals and Organizations, in SEXUAL HARASS-
NmNT rN m WORPLxACE 174, 175 (1996).
106 See Deborah Erdos Knapp and Gary A. Kustis, The Real "Disclosure": Sexual Har-
assment and the Bottom Line, in SExuAL. HARASSMENT Th ThE WORKPLACE 199, 203 (1996).
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ment. 10 7 Second, administrative costs reflect the separation, replace-
ment, and transfer costs that result when harassment occurs. 108 Finally,
the third category represents all direct "other" costs of sexual harassment
in an employment situation, including the costs of litigation and medical
or professional counseling.'0 9 The aggregate of these several costs repre-
sents the total cost of sexual harassment to an organization.
Kathy A. Hanisch used a different method to study the costs of sex-
ual harassment, by researching the multiple outcomes or consequences of
sexual harassment for individuals and organizations. 10 Hanisch's gen-
eral outcomes categories include health conditions, work role attitudes,
work withdrawal, job withdrawal, and litigation."' Many of these costs
have never been included in the studies used to determine the costs of
sexual harassment in the U.S.112 Hanisch asserts that this can only lead to
the conclusion that the costs of sexual harassment are potentially much
higher than any of the reported studies that have previously estimated
costs,113 and it therefore behooves organizations to have policies and
plans to discourage and discover sexual harassment to prevent many of
these costs." 14
When the multiple costs of sexual harassment are considered, it is
easier to justify strict liability for employers. Not only are there costs
that employers as organizations should avoid in order to increase their
efficiency and productivity, but there are also costs to the individual em-
ployees that have not previously been so distinctly calculated. Employ-
ers are in the best position to avoid such costs by implementing effective
sexual harassment policies and procedures. If such policies can reduce
the costs of sexual harassment to individuals and organizations effec-
tively enough so that their benefits outweigh their costs, strict liability for
all sexual harassment may be warranted.
IV. LIVING WITH FARAGHER AND ELLERTH: IMPLICATIONS
FOR EMPLOYERS
A. CASES SINCE FARAGHER AND ELLERTH
Putting aside the confusion in the Supreme Court's wisdom of as-
signing strict liability to employers in all forms of sexual harassment,
employers can be thankful that they are at least left with a more clear
107 See id.
108 See id. at 205-06.
109 See id. at 207.
110 See Hanisch, supra note 105, at 175.
111 See id. at 179.
112 See id. at 189.
113 See id.
114 See id. af 195.
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vision of their responsibilities under the law. Since June of 1998 advo-
cates for both employees and employers have praised the Supreme Court
for clearing up much of the murkiness that was left after the Meritor
decision in 1986.115 Unlike before, employers now know that the
Supreme Court will acknowledge an organization's sexual harassment
policy and place a premium upon it when the situation warrants. Em-
ployers should watch the courts carefully and follow their lead to avoid
liability where possible.
Because the new affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court
requires an analysis of both reasonableness and unreasonableness, it ap-
pears at first glance that it would be difficult for employers to prevail on
summary judgment. A review of cases by the New York Law Journal
since the Faragher/Ellerth ruling was set down, however, suggests that
summary judgment can be obtained where appropriate.1 16 For example,
in Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., a Southern District of Georgia judge
issued summary judgment for the employer because it had adequate sex-
ual harassment policies and procedures, and because the employees
failed to report the alleged harassment. 117
The need for an effective sexual harassment policy is highlighted by
the courts' refusal to grant summary judgment. 118 For example, in
Seepersaad v. D.A. O.R. Security, Inc., the Southern District of New York
found fact issues concerning the FaragherEllerth affirmative defense
that precluded summary judgment. 19 In that case, there was a question
as to whether the employer had used reasonable care in preventing and
correcting the harassment when it waited a week before transferring the
employee-plaintiff and beginning an investigation. 120 The plaintiff-em-
ployee had allegedly given repeated notice of her supervisor's harass-
115 See Linda Greenhouse, Court Spells Out Rules For Finding Sex Harassment, N.Y.
TvMEs, June 27, 1998 at Al. See also supra Part I.C.
116 See Bertrand C. Sellier, Courts Having Little Difficulty Applying New Harassment
Standards, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 25, 1998 at 1. Sellier's review of case law discovered summary
judgment for the employer granted in several cases where an effective harassment policy was
in place and the plaintiff employee was aware of it but failed to use it reasonably: Romero v.
Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., 14 F.Supp 2d 185 (D.P.R. 1998); Speight v. Albano Cleaners,
Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 560 (E.D.Va. 1998); Duran v. Flagstar Corp., 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1436 (D. Colo. 1998); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1443
(E.D. Cal. 1998); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F.Supp.2d 773 (W.D.Ky. 1998); Fierro v. Saks
Fifth Ave., 13 F.Supp.2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
117 See 20 F.Supp.2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
118 See Sellier, supra note 116, at 5. Sellier's review of case law discovered denials of
summary judgment for the employer in the following cases: Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trust-
ees, 12 F.Supp.2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 9 F.Supp.2d 955
(N.D. Ill. 1998); Booker v. Budget Rent a Car Sys., 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P. 45452 (M.D. Tenn.
1998).
119 20 F.Supp.2d 1379 (S.D.Ga. 1998).
120 See id.
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ment, to which the employer failed to respond. 121 Study of cases such as
this can help employers determine what works and what does not in de-
signing and implementing their sexual harassment policies.
B. RESPONDING To AND PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In time, courts will determine which sexual harassment policies are
reasonable and which are not. Eventually a clear standard may emerge
that will lessen the litigation on the subject. In the meantime however,
the combination of this uncertainty and the large increase in the number
of sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC, 122 a figure sure to
increase as a result of the recent high media attention to high-profile
sexual harassment cases, make it clear that employers should assume that
there is a single strict standard on what is acceptable conduct.
Over the years a number of commentators have attempted to de-
scribe the "right" policy and procedure for dealing with harassment and,
with the infusion of new standards, are sure to do so increasingly in the
future. Mary P. Rowe however believes that there is no perfect policy or
procedure for at least three reasons.' 23 First, Rowe believes it is nearly
impossible to design a complaint system that users will think is satisfac-
tory because it is nearly impossible to bring about a positive solution in
response to a subject like harassment. 124 Employers can only do their
best to lessen pain and learn how to better deal with the problem in the
future. Second, institutions differ in their purpose and structure.125 Solu-
tions that may be appropriate for one industry or company may not be
appropriate for another. Third, people disagree about what should actu-
ally be contained in such a policy or procedure.' 26 Individuals weigh
costs and benefits differently and that drives our conceptions of solutions
and approaches.
Rowe does believe however, that there are common issues that all
institutions reviewing their needs for harassment policies and procedures
must look at. First, Rowe believes that it is important to identify all
individuals who have interests at stake.' 27 Second, institutions must pre-
liminarily determine whether they need and want a specific or general
policy.' 2 8 Those who argue for specific policies note that there are dif-
121 See id.
122 See The Supreme Court issued two sexual harassment rulings last summer that should
both worry and hearten employers, NATION'S BusINEss, Dec., 1998 at 1.
123 See Mary P. Rowe, Dealing With Harassment: A Systems Approach in SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT iN THE WORKPLACE 241, 243 (1996).
124 See id. at 243.
125 See id. at 244.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 246.
128 See id. at 247.
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ferences in types of harassment and victims that require separate strate-
gies. 129 Those who argue for general policies note that harassment
affects everyone and a single general policy would be more widely un-
derstood. 130 Third, employers need to determine what options will be
provided to victims of sexual harassment. 131 Will employees be pro-
vided with a rights-based, win-lose investigation and adjudication? Will
employers instead deal only informally with harassment? Or will em-
ployers provide multiple options within the same sexual harassment pro-
cedural system? Rowe believes that no single option is right for most
complainants and instead they should be offered a choice so that the em-
ployee can himself or herself choose how to deal with the situation. 132
Fourth, employers need to determine whether the structure of their policy
will be centralized or decentralized. 133 Fifth, institutions need to be pre-
pared to deal with a number of inevitable issues, such as employees' fear
of reprisal, privacy versus an employer's right to know, free speech, con-
sensual relationships between supervisors and subordinate employees. 134
Finally, the most important function of the system is on-going preven-
tion. Employers should decide what is best for their company based
upon its own individual characteristics. 135
While there is no single policy that is universally accepted as per-
fect, attorney Michael F. Kleine asserts that the courts and the EEOC
have identified six core components that are essential to an effective sex-
ual harassment policy. 136 First, a policy should be in writing and contain
clear and unequivocal language stating that offenders will be disciplined
and could be disciplined up to and including termination. 137 Second, as
sexual harassment means different things to different people an employer
should clearly define harassment and provide examples of sexually
harassing conduct. 138 Third, a sexual harassment policy should contain
an effective reporting mechanism. 139 The policy should mandate that
conduct be reported immediately to a particular person or department
charged with the responsibility of investigating such complaints and pro-
vide an alternative person or department in the event that the designee is
129 See id.
130 See id. at 248.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 251.
133 See id. at 257.
134 See id. at 261-68.
135 See id. at 268.
136 See Michael F. Kleine, Practical Advice for Employers in Anticipation of Faragher's
Outcome, EMPLoYmENT LAw STRATEGIST, June 1998, at 1.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
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the harasser himself or herself.140 Fourth, the harassment policy should
assure employees that they would not be retaliated against for reporting
harassment.' 41 Fifth, the policy should provide for prompt investigation
of any complaints and assure privacy to the extent possible. 142 Sixth and
finally, the policy must be communicated to all employees.' 43 Employ-
ers should collect acknowledgements from all employees and periodi-
cally review the policy with employees to assure them of its continued
viability. 144
Beyond an effective sexual harassment policy, employers can use
other techniques to protect themselves as far as is allowed under the
Faragher/Ellerth decisions. Because the Supreme Court's rulings indi-
cate that an affirmative defense can be established when the plaintiff
failed to bring his or her complaint to the attention of the employer, some
commentators believe that other personnel policies designed to provide
alternative mechanisms for workers to assert grievances could provide
further protection.' 45 For example, an "open door policy" coupled with
an internal complaint review procedure enables an employer to identify
problems before they explode into lawsuits and also locks employees
into a factual scenario without later having the opportunity to change the
situation to their benefit in the proceedings.' 46 An employee who offers
a belated claim of harassment will have trouble establishing a legitimate
complaint in light of the complaint procedures in place. 147 In addition,
employers should develop ways to disseminate their policies to their
work forces in order to show that there is no question among employees
as to their rights and duties under the company's policy. 148 Also, em-
ployers can show their seriousness about the issue by providing supervi-
sors sensitivity training, forcefully showing a "zero tolerance" attitude
towards discrimination and harassment, and promptly responding to any
claims of harassment. 49 Further, employers can protect themselves
against those employees who resign and later claim harassment by re-
quiring all departing employees to complete an exit interview.150 This
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See Gerald Maatman and Jordan Cowman, Recent Supreme Court Cases on Sexual
Harassment: Loss Control and Risk Management Strategies for Employers, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT LITIGATION REPORTER, Dec. 1998 at 3.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id
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would serve to lock an employee into their assessment of their treatment
on the job.
While these methods are not foolproof, they do provide a loss con-
trol and risk management device to resolve and prevent problems. With
the little protection the law offers employers after Faragher and Ellerth,
they would be wise to do all they can to prevent liability or at least
lighten its blow. Until the lower courts sort out the confusion about the
standard that the Supreme Court has left, no one can definitively tell
employers what will work and what will not. However, by following the
above general guidelines and suggestions, even at their high cost, they
will be one step ahead of those employers who chose to take their
chances with nothing.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's recent decision may have increased the
liability of employers for the acts of their supervising employees in the
realm of sexual harassment, employers are also fortunate in knowing the
extent of their possible liability under the law. The Faragher/Ellerth
standard sorts out much of the questions regarding which party is respon-
sible for what - the supervising employee or the employer - and now at
least employers can make strides to protect themselves as much as possi-
ble with more guidance than they were afforded before. Only time, and
many lower court, decisions will tell employers what works and what
does not. Until then, it would be wise for employers to take the advice of
their attorneys in developing the most effective sexual harassment poli-
cies and prevention strategies.
